

Book Reviews

A Military History of Sovereign Hawai'i. By Neil Bernard Dukas. Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2004. x + 222 pp. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. \$17.95 paper

For most people around the world the history of military activity in Hawai'i probably begins and ends with iconic impressions of Pearl Harbor. In contrast, those that live in Hawai'i know that Kamehameha forged a kingdom in part with his army, and many may be able to identify several locations around the islands where he fought. Kamehameha was not the first, nor the last, Hawaiian warrior to fight on these islands, however. The book *A Military History of Sovereign Hawai'i* takes a broad and long term perspective of warfare on the islands, linking the ancient tradition to Kamehameha's nation building and subsequent struggles in the 19th century.

Dukas draws from a variety of sources relevant to Hawaiian warfare in the past, including information shared from current *lua* practitioners, and synthesizes and presents the available information on the ancient military tradition in a manner sufficient for general readership. This book is not advertised as a scholarly text, but given that the target audience may not have access to, or the desire to investigate the resources on this subject, it is all the more important that this book portray the current status of interpretations, assumptions, and ideas as accurately as possible.

For instance, in the otherwise succinct, clear, and interesting overview in his preface, Dukas (p. ix) draws upon archaeologist Ross Cordy's work *Exalted Sits the Chief: The Ancient History of Hawai'i Island* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2000) to declare in a footnote that "the 'wave migration theory' has now been discredited" (see Cordy, *Exalted*, p. 173). Cordy does address that issue, but does not reach that conclusion. He characterizes the popular notion of a second major influx of immigrants to the islands starting with Pa'ao and Pili as too simplistic, and notes that it is not verified with the archaeological evidence. Cordy then delves deeper into the issue by examining a variety of

lines of evidence that draws from oral tradition, political organization, fish hook styles, and even rat DNA. After much reflection on this issue (and sharing his opinion there may indeed have been a second wave of immigrants, but that they were integrated into the developing local culture in Hawai'i as opposed to revolutionizing it), Cordy concludes, "the question is unresolved. Caution is needed, along with careful objective research. The reader is urged to keep an open mind, as the writer hopes to do" (Cordy, *Exalted*, p. 181). Those reading Dukas' book will not have an opportunity to consider how the complexities and ramifications of this unresolved issue might be associated with Hawaiian military traditions.

Part I of *A Military of History of Sovereign Hawai'i*, entitled "Nā Koa (Warriors)" is divided into six topical chapters. The first two chapters present concepts of war within the context of Hawaiian *kapu*, chiefs, and commoners. The next four chapters cover details on weaponry, strategy, the field of battle, and warriors. The plentiful and interesting illustrations help the reader envision the concepts and events presented in the text. The presentation of the context is suitable for general readership, but the quantity of footnotes creates an expectation of scholarship that is not matched by the content. Valuable conceptual and analytical tools in this regard are missing, such as Carolyn Kēhaunani Cachola-Abad's (2000) dissertation "The Evolution of Hawaiian Socio-Political Complexity: An Analysis of Hawaiian Oral Traditions" (see Cachola-Abad, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 2000), Robert J. Hommon's (1976) dissertation "The Formation of Primitive States in Pre-Contact Hawai'i" (see Hommon, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976), and Valerio Valeri's book *Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii* (see Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), among others. The shortage of these kinds of documents in Dukas' discussion is all the more conspicuous knowing that he has chosen to draw upon three master's theses.

Magazine articles from *Military History* and *National Geographic* are also called upon as authorities. The citing of an article by Steenwyck (1999) in *Military History* for details of the battle of Kepūwaha'ula'ula or the "battle of the red-mouthed cannon," when he could have easily referenced Kamakau's *Ruling Chiefs of Hawai'i* (Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools Press, 1992), or Fornander's *Ancient History of the Hawaiian People* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1996) or others closer to the situation, is probably the worst example of reliance on tertiary sources (p. 32 footnote).

Dukas is at his best when applying his skills and experience with broad patterns of military history to the Hawaiian data. He addresses debatable topics with balance, insight, and creativity, as in his consideration of why the bow and arrow, available to the Hawaiians in ancient times, was not used in

battle. Another example is his perspective on the notion that the foreigners' weapons and the foreign advisors John Young and Isaac Davis, with their knowledge of western guns, ammunitions, and strategies, were the crucial difference in Kamehameha's victories. The muskets of that time took too long to load to be useful in the close quarter, hand-to-hand fighting style of the Hawaiians. Those smooth-bore guns were also inaccurate at close and far volleys, and were useful in battles where soldiers advanced and defended in tight formations, a strategy contrary to the loose battle arrangements and fluid movement of Hawaiian engagements. Dukas makes a strong case for his conclusion that the great noise and flashing gunpowder of the guns and cannons made a strong impression on those watching the battle, but that smoke and commotion did not make the difference in the outcome of the battle.

Part II, entitled "Koa Na Ka Lei Ali'i (Soldiers of the Crown)" begins at the cusp of the unification of the Hawaiian Islands. The first chapter, "The Twilight of the Old Order," is apropos of the alterations to the fundamental aspects of Hawaiian military during the earliest days of the kingdom. The newly formed centralized government was a radical change from the centuries of multiple chiefdoms ruled by changing members of the *'aha ali'i*. Success in maintaining power in this new configuration depended in the large part on removing the potential for armed rebellion from within. Weapons were quickly consolidated in the capitol, and the ability to train warriors was taken away from outlying chiefs. "Kamehameha and Liholiho may have well understood and appreciated the advantage of disarming the *kaukauali'i*, but in actually doing so, they sacrificed the economies inherent in the decentralized force. Centralization eliminated the shared burden of support" (p. 99). Events unfold in Part II in chronological order. The alterations to the military that were begun by Kamehameha I continue over the decades in the 19th century. Queen Ka'ahumanu banned boxing, because of the sinful connotations with gambling. With this act she removed a significant opportunity to perpetuate the fighting skills and techniques that fortified the local population. After that, the 1852 constitution eliminated the King's ability to declare war, and later the "armed forces of the kingdom were again allowed to sink into neglect. By 1873 the entire standing army of about forty men did little but stand guard at the palace, the treasury, and the prisons" (p. 142). A mutiny within the ranks precipitated the disbanding of the army that year, so no army existed at all for a short period.

The broad chronological sweep of this book provides a meaningful context for reflecting on the statement made by Hawaiian Minister of War Robert C. Wyllie in 1854 and repeated by the commander of the King's guard, Robert Hoapili Baker, in 1884: "in our weakness lies our strength" (p. 154). By this time, the old weapons were gone, as were the ways of organizing,

training, and deploying warriors. Hawaiian leaders chose to employ the new “weapons” of trade and diplomacy during times of strife against mightier nations casting their concerns and attentions towards the island kingdom (p. 113). The events of the 19th century, and the pressures on those in power in Hawai‘i at that time create a mutually reinforcing set of thought and action: leaders believed that they had a better chance of succeeding in surviving foreign incursions via diplomacy not warfare, so they allowed the army to decay to the point of irrelevancy. When incursions did occur, the near complete lack of an army forced the leaders to employ their sole tool, diplomacy.

Each of the few military actions taken by the Hawaiian militia in the 19th century are addressed in the book, but not in detail. This is true to one goal articulated by Dukas in his preface: “(m)y intention from the outset was not to write a chronicle that would belabor or bury a fascinating history in layers of detail” (p. vii). He achieves that goal and succeeds in providing interpretations and ideas that are appropriately generated from this broader perspective. For instance, we can observe that as the 19th century progressed, the military was a symbol of battle between the Crown and annexationists (p. 156). Examples are given of the successful application of diplomacy instead of force of arms, and the discussion of the military tradition includes how ethnic demographics influenced many decisions regarding deployment of armed men in the 19th century (p. 142–143).

A Military History of Sovereign Hawai‘i has much to offer. Dukas is to be commended for assembling the dispersed sets of information in a volume that will serve an equally diverse audience. He succeeds in his goal to “contribute to that discussion and to a better appreciation for the broad sweep of Hawai‘i’s remarkable military heritage” (p. viii).

Thomas R. Wolforth
Hawai‘i Island Operations Manager
Scientific Consultant Services, Inc., Honolulu

Plague and Fire: Battling the Black Death and the 1900 Burning of Honolulu’s Chinatown. By James C. Mohr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xi + 235 pp. Illustrated. Notes. Index. \$30.00.

The January 20, 1900 accidental burning of Honolulu’s Chinatown was the largest non-military disaster in Hawaii’s history; it was the central event in the desperate efforts to combat the spread of the pandemic of plague that threat-

ened Hawaii from 1899 to 1900. Noted medical historian James Mohr's well-crafted narrative clearly details the events leading up to and following this civic disaster. Using extensive primary materials from newspapers and personal papers, he examines how the three-physician Honolulu Board of Health used its nearly dictatorial authority, relying on the new medical science of bacteriology to reject economic, racial, and American annexation pressures to successfully combat the plague during a five month period.

While scientists had isolated the organism that caused the plague in 1894, physicians did not understand how this disease was spread nor how to treat it. Medical science still believed that the plague could be transmitted from person to person. When the plague entered Honolulu in the fall of 1899, it hit the Chinatown district, the worst slum area of the city, populated primarily by Chinese, Japanese, and Native Hawaiian workers who lived in terribly crowded one- and two-story wooden buildings. Governor Sanford Dole, in desperation, turned nearly total authority to stop this public health emergency over to the Honolulu Board of Health, composed of Nathaniel Emerson, Francis Day, and Clifford Wood. These physicians had received top quality medical educations in the United States where they had studied and embraced the emerging field of bacteriology; they would base their public health decisions on their knowledge of this new field. These men were given the unchecked authority to seize and destroy public property, to remove and incarcerate citizens against their will, to command the National Guard, police and fire department forces, and to use the national treasury as they saw fit. Taking full advantage of this authority, the Board created a series of successful, if somewhat draconian, policies to successfully deal with the plague in Chinatown.

The Board's initial concern was to isolate the plague in Chinatown by using the National Guard to quarantine this district of Honolulu. While this action caused serious economic and racial problems, it did limit the plague's spread and kept plague deaths to a small number. By late December 1899, the Board decided on the drastic, yet clinically proven, anti-plague measure of authorizing controlled burning of specific buildings in Chinatown where plague victims had been found. The British pioneered this preventive procedure in their efforts to stop the spread of the plague in Hong Kong in the 1890's. Following these orders, Honolulu's well-trained fire department daily burned down supposedly infected buildings in Chinatown. On January 20, 1900, the fire department set another controlled fire, which quickly turned uncontrollable due to a sudden, unexpected change in the wind conditions. By the end of that day 25 blocks of Honolulu were destroyed and over six thousand people were homeless. The Board acted quickly and decisively to build and maintain temporary housing for these individuals, though major

cultural tensions emerged in these detention camps among the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiian detainees. The Board also faced almost daily challenges to their handling of the plague situation from Honolulu's older physicians who mistrusted the Board's reliance on bacteriology to justify its policies.

On April 31, 1900, the Board ended all plague regulations and returned its authority to Dole's government. That same day, President William McKinley signed an act creating a territorial government for Hawaii. The Honolulu Board of Health's heroic actions demonstrated how professional medical competence could overcome professional jealousies within the medical community; the strong racial divisions that existed within Hawaii; and economic pressures to lift the quarantine so sugar plantation owners could use Chinatown workers. The Board had also had to contend with growing demands from the wealthy white community, which wanted the Board to order the deliberate burning of all of Chinatown to end the threat of the plague entering their part of Honolulu. Basing their decisions on bacteriological findings, the Board undertook the best possible solutions at that time to protect the public's health. Mohr's study thoroughly describes this landmark event in Hawaii's history and places it directly within the context of its time.

Jonathon Erlen, Ph.D.
Behavioral and Community Health Services
Graduate School of Public Health
University of Pittsburgh

Teaching Mikadoism: The Attack on Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii, California, and Washington, 1919–1927. By Noriko Asato. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. xviii + 176 pp. Illustrated. Bibliography. Appendix. Index. \$40.00 cloth

In *Teaching Mikadoism*, Noriko Asato examines the Japanese language school controversy that embroiled Hawai'i beginning in 1919 and soon spread to California and Washington. In the 1910s, government leaders in Hawai'i—then a territory—invited the U.S. Bureau of Education to send a commission to the Islands to examine educational conditions there. One of the targets for investigation was the Japanese language schools. In its report, the federal commission concluded that the language schools were un-American. It recommended, therefore, that the territorial legislature abolish the schools and that instead the Department of Public Instruction (DPI), which ran the pub-

lic schools, offer classes in Japanese and other non-English languages. In other words, the commission agreed with the community leaders whom they interviewed—that the DPI, and not immigrants, should control the teaching of the Japanese language.

News of the report—called the federal education survey—reached the West Coast, where anti-Japanese agitators in California and Washington used the language school issue to pressure the federal government to end Japanese immigration. Furthermore, these agitators pressed their state legislatures to pass additional land laws that would, according to the laws' proponents, block the economic upward mobility of the *nikkei* (ethnic Japanese) who had settled in these two states.

There are a number of studies that have examined facets of the Japanese language school issue. The value of Asato's monograph is threefold. First of all, it builds on earlier works at the same time that it critiques the shortcomings of these previous studies. Secondly, the book makes deft use of both Japanese and English language sources. Asato's ability to access written and oral sources in both languages provides her with a powerful research capability. And thirdly, this study connects the controversies in three locations—Hawai'i, California, and Washington—while illuminating the uniqueness of each. Such border-crossing in historical studies is particularly difficult because historians pride themselves in unearthing the particulars of an episode within a specific contextual setting. The result is a nuanced and multi-layered analysis of an important language issue that in 1927 was finally decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Japanese language schools withstood attacks from so-called Americanizers, Japanese exclusionists, and others who felt threatened by the influx of people seemingly different from themselves. Japanese immigrants resisted the onslaught not only because of the need—as they saw it—to close the language gap that separated them from their English-speaking children, but also because the schools served as their common “public space” and a “cultural symbol” of their ethnic community (pp. 107–108).

As the author notes, the schooling of minority youths has been and continues to be an issue that is central to the relationship between those in society who are more powerful and those less so. The history of the language school controversy exposed a central theme of vision for the future, not just for Japanese, but for many other immigrants as they have struggled to make a place for themselves in their adopted country.

*Eileen H. Tamura, Professor of Education
University of Hawai'i at Mānoa*

Honor Killing: How the Infamous "Massie Affair" Transformed Hawai'i. By David E. Stannard. New York: Viking, 2005. ix + 460 pp. Illustrated. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$25.95 cloth

Cultural studies has been quite the rage in academe during the past 20 years and designates a rapidly growing cross-disciplinary effort for analyzing the conditions that affect the production, reception and cultural significance of all types of events, institutions, practices and products. Events, as much as literature, are viewed by its practitioners as signifying practices. A chief concern of cultural studies is to examine the functioning of the social, economic, and political forces and power structures that produce cultural phenomenon and endow them with their social meanings, their truth, the modes of discourse in which they are discussed, and their relative value in a given society.

The French thinker Roland Barthes typically gets credit for initiating the discipline in his book *Mythologies*, which was written in 1957 but not widely available in the U.S. until it was translated into English in 1972. His book analyzed the social conventions and "codes" that confer significance in such diverse social practices and "texts" as wrestling, food preparation, and women's fashions. British neo-Marxism added an additional layer of examination of working-class literature and art with the publication of works by Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart in the late 1950s. In the U.S., the popularity of cultural studies found root primarily in the mode of literary and cultural criticism known as the new historicism, with its antecedents in the post-structuralist theories of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault, and in the treatment of culture as a set of signifying systems by Clifford Geertz and other cultural anthropologists.

Today, the field has expanded dramatically and found an institutional home in American academia. Notable activities are the analysis and interpretation of events, objects, and social practices outside formal literature and the arts. These social creations are viewed as endowed with meanings that are the product of social forces and conventions, and that may either express or oppose the dominant structures of power in a society. Cultural studies have found little limit to the kinds of behaviors and things to which an analysis of "cultural texts" may be applied.

University of Hawai'i at Mānoa American Studies professor David E. Stannard employs the tools of cultural studies to record a complex "cultural text" which he feels reveals the structures of race, class, and ethnicity in Hawai'i in the early years of the Great Depression. Using numerous contemporary accounts, especially the definitive 300-page Pinkerton National Detective Agency report, and the U.S. Justice Department report of Seth Richardson,

Stannard has written a detailed account of a trial which he feels summed up the structures of race, class, and political oppression.

The general outline of the dramatic and tragic story has been known for decades and much of *Honor Killing* is not new. In September of 1931, in a city dominated by military and corporate interests, and a less-than-representative local Republican Party, military wife Thalia Massie accused five non-white men of gang rape. The charges of the unstable woman led to numerous investigations and the case against the five led to a hung jury. Outraged, Thalia's Southern-born naval husband and her East Coast socialite mother arranged the kidnapping and murder of the lead suspect, Joseph Kahahawai. The national press, especially the W. R. Hearst-owned newspapers, described the murder of Kahahawai as a justifiable killing and a kind of "honor killing." With much of American opinion inflamed against Hawai'i's fragile self-rule in a remote U.S. territory, the famed liberal trial attorney Clarence Darrow arrived in Honolulu to defend the killers.

Nearly bankrupted by huge stock market losses, Darrow led an ignoble and ultimately unsuccessful court battle to free the accused. Despite pressure from military leaders in Hawai'i as well as the mainland, and pressures from some members of Hawai'i's ruling elite, a local jury found the accused guilty of manslaughter and convicted them to ten years in prison. Stannard argues that Hawai'i's Republican-appointed governor, Lawrence Judd, apparently reacting to pressure from oligarchs such as Walter Dillingham, and to President Herbert Hoover's Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur, commuted the sentences to one hour in his office and asked that the Massies leave Honolulu forever.

Using numerous personal letters, unpublished interviews, the post-facto Pinkerton investigative report, trial documents, and personnel and medical records, Stannard skillfully recreates the court scenes, places the events in the context of U.S. culture and history, especially that of the Southern states, and finds in the events cause for condemnation of the military leadership, Hawai'i's ill-concealed racial biases, the corruption of the territory's Republican leadership, and the tourist industry's oleaginous promoters. Clearly, Stannard reads the "cultural texts" well as he describes the ideologies, practices, attitudes, and beliefs, which reflected dominant class interests in a reactionary pre-war Hawai'i.

The most original part of the lengthy book is, however, less compelling and far less developed and defended than it needed to be for the work to break substantial new ground. In an important final chapter, Stannard argues that the moral outrage at the injustice of Governor Judd's commutation (though many in the military and many in Congress sought a pardon) and anger at the *haole* Republican establishment by the Hawaiians, Asians,

and white Democrats, led to the eventual unraveling of Republican party domination, greater inter-racial harmony, a development of a sense of being "local" by many in the community, the refusal to incarcerate large numbers of Japanese-Americans in Hawai'i after Pearl Harbor, and the eventual overthrow of the Republicans in the famous 1954 territorial elections. This growing sense of multi-ethnic solidarity helped by a single pan-ethnic creole which provide the linguistic basis for solidarity, also aided the unionization efforts of the late 1930's and post-war years. Moreover, the often ambiguous and tense relationship with U.S. military was forever impacted by the racial humiliation of the Massie case. Stannard credits the idealism and solidarity that emerged from this confrontation with "raw, white power during the rape and murder trials of 1931-32" as a neglected reason for the rise of contemporary Hawai'i in the 1950's and 1960's.

Those claims, though poignant, are suggestive rather than definitive. Clearly, the Republican Party, an alliance of many Hawaiian and *haole* voters, which dominated the first half of the 20th century, may well have been weakened by the outrageous trials. But in my estimation, he overemphasizes the trials in that political development while misreading the extent to which the *haole* business establishment sided with the Massies. In an undeveloped paragraph, Stannard admits that the findings of the Pinkerton report were defended and Darrow's defense of the killers was condemned by members of the white aristocracy, including Alfred Castle, one of the territory's leading tax attorneys (a partner in one of Hawai'i's most powerful legal firms and the reviewer's grandfather) and the retired territorial Supreme Court Chief Justice Alexander Robertson. Stannard admits that most members of the Honolulu Bar opposed the Massies' actions as well as their defense, but does not explore the extent to which others in the "oligarchy" sided with the general population. In fact, for example, many of the missionary descendants who formed part of the oligarchy were at odds with the Massies and strongly opposed to the threats of some in the U.S. military to call for the end of Hawai'i's limited self-rule. Stannard also mentions that William R. Castle, Jr., Undersecretary of State for President Hoover and the brother of Alfred, would have been positioned to influence President Hoover on the Massie trial. Yet, an examination of the Hoover-Castle papers in the Hoover Presidential Library in Iowa shows that no discussion about the case appears in official papers or unofficial diaries. With the exigencies of the Great Depression and the alarming international events in China and Japan, the Hoover administration paid little attention to the matter; Secretary of the Interior Ray L. Wilbur mainly hoped the Massies would be deported and the embarrassing problem would go away.

This reviewer recently studied the Massie murder file at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. The documents in Box 64, files 6 and 7 reveal that Secretary of the Interior Wilbur, later the President of Stanford University, received countless angry letters and telegrams asking him to clean up the rumored mess in Honolulu's police department and to order a pardon of the Massies. These demands came primarily from groups in Southern states, but also occasionally came from individuals in Hawai'i who claimed to lack faith in the ability of a white person to receive a fair trial or a competent investigation by local police. At one point, William D. Mitchell, Hoover's Attorney General, advised Wilbur that Hawai'i's judicial branch of government was and should remain independent of the executive and legislative branches. Wilbur agreed and allowed the judicial procedures in the Territory of Hawai'i to proceed without any interference from his office. He was in periodic contact with Governor Judd but there is no evidence that he interfered with Judd's actions or that he pressured Judd to pardon the Massies. The files further indicate that Secretary of the Navy, Charles Francis Adams, expressed concern about the position of the U.S. Navy in Hawai'i and the perceived inability of the civilian government to ensure law and order. But at no time did Adams attempt to do more than advise Wilbur that naval officials were dismayed at the actions of law enforcement in the Territory and the possible repercussions for U.S. security. Pressure for martial law or the curtailment of the Territory's traditional civil liberties was real, but it came primarily from congressional listening to domestic outcries and from the disdain from Pearl Harbor Admiral Yates Stirling for Hawai'i's civilian rule. But the pressure quickly abated with the Massies fleeing the Islands in the spring of 1932. While wanting the disgraceful events to go away and the Pinkerton report not to be made public, at least immediately, the Hoover administration never entertained the idea of changes to Hawai'i's existing territorial status.

Furthermore, in addition to overemphasizing the solidarity of the ruling oligarchs, Stannard also overemphasizes the influence of Walter Dillingham on President Hoover and his fellow Republicans. Dillingham, a major defense contractor and heavy construction magnate, took a position largely favorable to the Massies and pressured the governor to suppress the Pinkerton report. Yet, Dillingham was often at odds with other Republicans and hardly represented the "Big Five" corporations or their leadership. Additionally, while Dillingham constantly lobbied for military contracts and had contact with the Secretary of the Navy, he exercised less influence over the Hoover administration than Stannard implies. Indeed, Stannard makes Dillingham a kind of ideological caricature rather than the nuanced person with varied interests he actually was.

Stannard's account of the consequences of the trials for a changing Hawai'i is flawed and lacks a full defense and elucidation. No one can doubt that the trials did expose terrible flaws in the American character and in the racial and gender politics of the territory. He overdraws those consequences and attempts to connect too many dots. That being said, the book is a well written, if unnuanced, dramatic reading of an important cultural text of the Great Depression. In that reading, we can learn a great deal of the values, images, metaphors, symbols and cultural iconography of an event freighted with political, economic, and racial meanings.

Al Castle
Executive Director of the Samuel N. &
Mary Castle Foundation

No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawai'i during World War II.
 By Franklin Odo. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004. vii +
 328 pp. Illustrated. Index. \$39.50 cloth

"I started this project by doing what I thought would be simple oral histories of perhaps one dozen men who had participated in an unusual patriotic endeavor in 1942" (p. 8), confessed Franklin Odo, *No Sword to Bury* author and director of the Smithsonian Asian Pacific American Program. But what began with modest ambitions became a full-length study of the Varsity Victory Volunteers (VVV), comprised of 169 nisei men in Hawai'i during World War II. And despite the small number of VVV men as compared with the some 160,000 Japanese Americans in the Islands at the time or the more than 10,000 nisei men from Hawai'i who served in the U.S. military during the war, the VVV story recounts "uncommon stories of seemingly ordinary lives" (p. 4), and speaks to large issues of migration and the process of becoming an "American."

With Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry into the war, over 50 years of "yellow peril" rhetoric (involving racializations of Japanese as the enemy) influenced the treatment Japanese Americans received from their government. On the West Coast at less than one percent of the population, Japanese Americans were easy targets for forced removals to concentration camps, but in Hawai'i, Japanese Americans comprised nearly 40 percent of the Territory's population and their labor was critical for the economic well-being of the Islands. The "Japanese problem," then, for the U.S. was the control of that group to ensure their "loyalty" and above all, their productivity.

Those exertions, Odo tells his readers, exemplified the process of hegemony or order maintained by all-pervasive social institutions and their instruments.

Initially rejected for military service, 169 of Hawai'i's nisei volunteered to engage in manual labor for a year in the VVV, and later, when allowed, many joined the famed 442nd Regimental Combat Team as foot soldiers, and the Military Intelligence Service as Japanese-language experts. The young men's motives for serving in the VVV and the effects of that service are two of this book's concerns. The oral histories of former VVV members and "considerable time" (p. 8) spent with them during the 1980s and 1990s give substance to the book's narrative, providing insights into the men's personal lives and when they "elected to take an unusual initiative in the face of hostile action from their own society" (p. 4), at least in retrospect.

Moreover, Odo contends, former VVV members led the strategy that ultimately freed Hawai'i from the dominance of the white oligarchy and, at the same time, fostered the "model minority" myth of Asian and Japanese Americans. That version of the past, of triumph over adversity with World War II as the dividing line between exclusion and inclusion, is the prevailing interpretation in Asian American and Hawai'i history, Odo alleges. This is inclusive of works by liberals and progressives alike, and it has contemporary political consequences that must be confronted. *No Sword to Bury*, its author maintains, offers an alternative interpretation to Hawai'i as melting pot or racial paradise and, at the other extreme, as a colonized dependency of the Big Five. "In fact," he correctly points out, "the political and cultural contexts were more fluid and accessible to influence and manipulation from various avenues than previously assumed, and the history of the VVV helps illustrate this point" (p. 7).

Thoroughly familiar with Hawai'i and Japanese American history, Odo recounts that past with confidence and grace, and, illustrated by family stories, the issei experience and nisei coming of age spring vividly to life. Before Pearl Harbor's fire, nisei men faced an array of demands from international, national, and local arenas, including Japan's imperial wars, the Great Depression, schooling, and an "Americanization" movement that sought to render them "safe" from democracy. Those demands came to a head with the onset of war when Japanese Americans, because of racism, were put on the spot to prove their loyalty to the U.S. That demonstration "seemed necessary at the time" (p. 115), and thus most of the nisei joined the VVV "to do my part" (p. 157), after having grown up in a racially and ethnically stratified society, after having seen their fathers, for a few, summarily interned followed Pearl Harbor, and after witnessing Japanese Americans forcibly evicted from military areas and from the Hawaii Territorial Guard.

Despite it all, the VVV men served, like Akira Otani who was "mad as

hell" when he and other nisei were expelled from the Territorial Guard but later volunteered for free manual labor. "Apparently I didn't analyze all this," he recalled. "You just did things, you know. They were looking for people. Fine, let's go" (p. 157). Stationed at Schofield Barracks on O'ahu, the VVV men painted, repaired, and erected buildings, quarried and shoveled rocks, cleared ground cover and strung barbed wire, and cooked and worked in the kitchen. For recreation, they formed basketball and football teams, and got involved in boxing and tennis. They participated in blood and war bond drives, gave speeches to community groups, and generally served as model citizens in support of the U.S. war effort. In fact, various individuals and interest groups used the VVV as a prime example of Japanese American loyalty. That public relations ploy, Odo observes, of transforming Japanese Americans "from victims to models was a brilliant vision" (p. 219) realized by the nisei in collaboration with Hawai'i's military government, the FBI, key local *haole* leaders, and other Asian Americans.

Most of the VVV men went on to serve in the U.S. military, seven of them died in the conflict, and after the war's end, many became influential in the life of the Territory. Men like Ted Tsukiyama and Masato Doi practiced law and played prominent roles in the 1954 "bloodless revolution" that usurped a half century of *haole* Republican Party rule and installed a labor-led Democratic Party. Others like Shiro Amioka, Ryoji Namba, and George Yamamoto became university professors, and a number pursued business careers. Yugo Okubo was a labor and union leader, and Yoshiaki Fujitani followed his father as a Buddhist priest. Their story, seemingly from failure to success, helped to establish Japanese American loyalty during the war and affirms the "model minority" narrative for Asian Americans. Above all, it supports a fundamental paradigm of U.S. democracy and history, involving the immigration saga of poverty and constraints in the Old World, plenty and opportunities in the New World, and an ascent from the depths of despair and discrimination upon arrival in the U.S. to the heights of achievement and final triumph.

No Sword to Bury, accordingly, engages huge issues and themes while paying attention to the particulars of individuals and their everyday lives. In truth, the book's most compelling aspect is the recollections of the central figures of this history, who are as diverse as the exceptional and wonderfully contrary Yugo Okubo. "If we are to be credited with the shaping of society," he said, "let us be credited for our silence . . . If we are to be credited let it be for what once was a noble cause 40 years ago. Let us be credited today for our unquestioning of the status quo, our blindness to injustice, and our ignoring of the victims of society." And, "let us be credited for our grandchildren who might get angry and fight for justice at home and abroad" (p. 272-273). For

animating lives such as Yugo Okubo, whose interview audiotape and transcription are housed at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa in the Hamilton Library's Special Collections, *No Sword to Bury* deserves a wide and appreciative reading.

Gary Okihiro, *Professor of International and
Public Affairs and Director
Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race
Columbia University*

Lost Generations: A Boy, A School, A Princess. By J. Arthur Rath. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. 1 + 361 pp. Illustrated. Index. \$20.00

As a fellow graduate of the Kamehameha School for Boys, J. Arthur Rath's book, *Lost Generations: A Boy, A School, A Princess*, triggered memories and emotions of my past. Like the author, I attended Kamehameha Schools at a time when Hawaiians of varying abilities were in attendance. In spite of the differences in admission abilities, it was clear to everyone who knew Kamehameha School graduates that they were special people. Through this book, the author has done a superb job of introducing a host of special Kamehameha graduates.

Besides connecting to my past, I found the book to be both entertaining and informative. By combining an autobiography with the history of Hawaiians, the author communicates a compelling story. Particularly revealing is his coverage of the years in which the trustees of the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate took management away from the schools' principals and president, failed to meet the educational mission of the schools, and mismanaged the finances of the Estate. His creative use of a *talk story* format, which involved one-on-one conversations with Kamehameha School graduates, provides clarity to the many conflicts resulting from actions taken by the Bishop Estate trustees. Moreover, the *talk story* format helps present a Hawaiian perspective to all the turmoil surrounding the Kamehameha Schools.

There are scant works dealing with the history of the Kamehameha Schools.¹ For that reason, this book is an important addition to the many recent books written by Hawaiians.² More importantly, for the first time, an investigation of the Kamehameha Schools illustrates how Princess Pauahi Bishop's legacy helped nurture Hawaiians through education and how those

Hawaiians, who were the beneficiaries of her gift, contributed to resurrecting Hawaiian culture and spawning a second Hawaiian revolution.³ The Princess did this by willing her wealth to educate Hawaiians so that they could meet the challenges of a transformed Hawai'i. It was her intention that the Kamehameha Schools produce industrious men and women, able to help Hawaiians survive and contribute to a Hawai'i where *haole* were the dominant class.

Rath's own personal history connects well with the overall history of Hawai'i. His ancestors included the great chief Kuāli'i, a ruler of O'ahu and Kaua'i during ancient times, David Belden Lyman and Sarah Joiner Lyman, American Protestant missionaries who arrived with the Fifth Company and founded the Hilo Boys' Boarding School, and Chung Ahung, a Chinese immigrant from Macao, who helped start the sugar industry in Hawai'i.

The author infers that the title of this book, "lost generations," refers to all Hawaiians who since the end of Hawaiian sovereignty have lost their language and culture to an encroaching Western civilization. Through all those years, from 1893 to the present, the only Hawaiians not lost were the fortunate ones who attended the Kamehameha Schools. These recipients of a Kamehameha education, besides being taught how to be industrious men and women, were instilled with a sense of bonding and racial and individual pride. It is due to all the generations who missed obtaining a Kamehameha Schools education that the guests in Rath's *talk story* surmise how much more good the Kamehameha Schools could do for Hawaiian children if the Board of Trustees was replaced. As a result of a letter to the local media from Nona Beamer, a highly acclaimed expert of the hula and Hawaiian culture, and the courage of one Bishop Estate trustee, Oswald Stender, a second Hawaiian revolution began.

The author does a credible job identifying key players in the drama that led to success of this revolution and the ousting of corrupt Bishop Estate trustees. He purposely portrays the conflict as one between good and evil. This portrayal results in this book's greatest weakness, the oversimplification of some of the key players and the underestimation of the power brokers. As a result, he casts Governor Ben Cayetano in the role of being supportive of Hawaiians when, in reality, the governor was never a friend of Hawaiians. Although Rath comes closer to understanding the power brokers in his chapter, "Same Old, Same Old," he claims more of a victory for Hawaiians than actually occurred, as he never connects that all the key players after the second revolution had strong ties and allegiances to the same power brokers of the Democratic Party who appointed the corrupt trustees. While it was the expectation of the revolutionaries that the Kamehameha Schools would

serve more Hawaiians once a new set of trustees was selected, the fact of the matter is that the Kamehameha Schools still do not serve enough Hawaiians, resulting in the continual "lost generations" of Hawaiians.

In spite of its shortcomings, due to the interest in anything written about Hawai'i and because the Kamehameha Schools are well known throughout the United States, this book should have tremendous interest nationally. Although the author calls the social upheaval he depicts a revolution, it is clear from his *talk stories*, that it was a quiet movement of "good people . . . [who] live with dignity, joy, confidence, peace, and kindness" (p. 2). Rath states that these people "teach us about courage, overcoming evil, healing the spirit, making love endure, and keeping promises" (p. 2). However, since the author did not intend this book to fit a scholarly genre, resulting in very little of his research being documented, scholars may find little value in this book. In spite of this shortcoming, Rath did a commendable job preparing to write this book. He attended court hearings, collected legal papers, reviewed archival documents, studied press reports, and interviewed people for much of the material he includes. Nevertheless, it is still unfortunate that he did not document his sources. Due to the legacy of Princess Pauahi Bishop, the unique educational system employed at the Kamehameha Schools, and the contributions made by its graduates to Hawaiian and American society, the history of the Kamehameha Schools requires serious future scholarship.

C. Kalani Beyer
Professor of Teacher Education
National University

NOTES

- ¹ Other than a dissertation written by Loring Hudson and a compilation of memories written by Uldrich Thompson, a former Kamehameha Boys' School instructor, no other major source deals with the history of the Kamehameha Schools. See Loring Hudson, "History of the Kamehameha Schools" (M.A. thesis, University of Hawai'i, 1935), Uldrich Thompson, *Reminiscences of Kamehameha Schools* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1922).
- ² Manette K. P. Beham and Ronald H. Heck, *Culture and Educational Policy in Hawai'i: Silencing of Native Voices* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998); Rona T. Hulualani, *In the Name of Hawaiians: Native Identities and Cultural Politics* (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota, 2002); Lilikalā Kame'eiehiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai?* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i Press, 1992); George H. S. Kanahale, *Ku Kanaka, Stand Tall: A Search for Hawaiian Values* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i Press, 1992); Jonathan K. Osorio, *Dismembering*

Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Noenoe Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

- ³ The first revolution occurred when Native Hawaiians attempted to prevent *haole* reactionaries from overthrowing Hawaiian sovereignty. The second revolution refers to the ousting of the Bishop Estate trustees.

Hawaii's Forgotten History 1900–1999: the Good . . . the Bad . . . the Embarrassing. By Rich Budnick. Honolulu: Aloha Press, 2005. 256 pp. Illustrated. Bibliography. \$14.95.

Budnick's *Hawaii's Forgotten History* is a collection of short descriptions of events in Hawai'i, beginning on January 8, 1900 with the first 26 Okinawans arriving in Hawai'i for the 'Ewa Planation, and ending on December 31, 1999 with residents breaking the law while celebrating the millennium. In between are hundreds of events, some important and others trivial. Some are commonly known, such as the general outline of the Massie case, while others have been largely forgotten, such as the political tactics of the anti-communists of the 1940s. Not all of the events will interest every reader—it would be difficult to find someone interested in movie stars, labor disputes, military base openings, eruptions at Mauna Kea, sugar plantations, and early plane flights between the islands—but everyone who wants to know about Hawai'i will find something worthwhile in this book.

It is interesting, for instance, to learn how often corporations used the police and the laws to suppress any kind of dissension or labor organization. The Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, for example, sent a telegram on December 27, 1942 opposing the restoration of civilian government and the lifting martial law in part because its members benefited from the frozen wages and the prohibition of workers' strikes. Another such example is the fate of Pablo Manlapit (which is described in the entry for October 11, 1924), who was falsely found guilty of perjury and sent to the Philippines following a strike at a sugar plantation on Kaua'i.

There could have been more details about local biographies. The birth and death dates of every notable person in Hawai'i should have been included. As it stands, however, the book does not even have entries for Don Ho being born in 1930 or for Israel Kamakawiwo'ole being born in 1959.

There also could have been more discussion of movies and music. Shirley Temple and Elvis Presley are mentioned, but when were Abbott and Costello on the Islands? And while some of the important movies and television shows

set in Hawai'i are listed, all of them should have been. For example, the three-episode series of the *Brady Bunch* in Hawai'i, where the boys are cursed by an ancient taboo and where Don Ho has a cameo appearance, first aired on September 22, 1972. Likewise, there are no entries for specific albums being released, or for who won the Nā Hōkū Hanohano awards, which were first awarded in 1978.

Part of the problem with what is included in *Hawaii's Forgotten History* is that the book relies heavily on the Honolulu newspapers, and so suffers many of the same limitations. Specifically, just as newspapers seldom follow-up on stories, the book is not very good at describing what happened later. Also, the entries seem to take for granted that readers know who particular people are, and so at times become rather cryptic. For instance, on September 27, 1904, Jose Miranda stabs and kills Edward Damon, but while Miranda is described as an "unemployed Puerto Rican," there is no explanation of who Damon was or why the Hawai'i flag was flown at half-staff when he was buried. A significant part of the story that is left out is that [Samuel] Edward Damon was the son of Samuel Mills Damon II, who was part of a wealthy *haole* family and later established the Damon Trust.

The book has one fatal flaw: it does not have an index. This omission not only makes it impractical to find a particular event unless the reader knows the date, but it also means that cross-referencing is impossible. For instance, readers cannot easily connect events in one year with other years. This is most unfortunate if someone wanted to trace the history of a particular place, company, or person, or follow the results of a particular event (such as the labor disputes or the various, and often failed, development projects). How, for instance, has Kapi'olani Park changed over the years? Budnick has some of the details, including the government's order on December 7, 1942 to destroy the Phoenix water fountain in the park because it "was seen to represent Japanese imperialism," but without an index, it is hard to organize the events any way but chronologically.

The absence of an index likely explains another quirk of the book's organization. The entry for one year sometimes contains the entire discussion of the history spanning a range of years. For instance, on May 20, 1907, Jack London arrived in Hawai'i. But rather than provide some information on what London did during this stay, the entry instead notes that he returns in 1915 and 1916 (and there are no entries for 1915 and 1916 that describe these events). Given the overall structure of the book, it would have been better to have two or three entries for London (and perhaps others that detail when his writings about Hawai'i were published) and let the reader piece the history together. Ironically, in these cases, the chronological organization of the entries ends up confusing the chronology.

The first time reading through *Hawaii's Forgotten History* was entertaining and informative. The reader realizes how unique Hawai'i's history has been, and realizes at the same time how pervasive conflicts over class and race have been. Modern Hawai'i has been created out of conflict, and Budnick helps to trace its history one event at a time. But the periodic lack of depth and the lack of an index make the book a little more irritating after the first reading is finished.

Brian Richardson
Librarian and Instructor
Windward Community College